




22 July 1966

OCI No. 0299/66

Copy No. 52

WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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FURTHER INTERNAL SHAKEUP INDICATED IN ALBANIA

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De Gaulle seems to be trying to avoid any written statement which would lead to automatic involvement of French forces in wartime. Given the current domestic pressure on the government in Germany, he may also hope to hold out for a more favorable status for French troops there.

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Yerovi's capitulation to provincial strikers protesting his financial measures may lead other groups to strike

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GUATEMALA'S REACTIONS TO RECENT GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS

22

Some extremists are getting government posts, possibly because of President Mendez' inexperience or poor advice, and conservative circles are concerned.

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VIETNAM PEACE MISSIONS TO MOSCOW FAIL

To the surprise of none of the parties concerned, Indira Gandhi and Harold Wilson last week found Moscow stony ground for planting proposals for peace in Vietnam.

About the only common element in the missions of the two prime ministers was the need to accommodate political pressures at home. Neither expected a favorable response to proposals which, although framed very differently, were alike in urging that Moscow take an active role, as cosponsor of the Geneva agreement of 1954, in arranging peace negotiations. The two leaders also appealed to the Russians to intercede with Hanoi on behalf of American prisoners of war. Ostensibly, and for the record, these appeals were rejected on the grounds that it was a matter for Hanoi to decide.

The Soviets took what diplomatic profit they could from the Indians but gave the British short shrift. When the high-level meetings were over, the visitors had at least demonstrated that they had done what they could for peace in Vietnam, while the Soviets, though they would probably have been happier had their guests stayed home, could take credit for having shown themselves stern, steadfast allies of the North Vietnamese.

Mrs. Gandhi, anticipating the problem of an unprotected left flank in India's 1967 elections, sought to forestall domestic criticism of New Delhi's increasingly close ties with the US by again demonstrating India's independent outlook. However, she accepted explicitly anti-Western references in the communique which closed the visit, indicating she was no match for the apparently hard-bargaining Soviets. She nevertheless secured for India a Soviet agreement to extend about \$630 million in new aid and to carry over \$420 million in previous commitments to help finance India's fourth five-year plan.

Wilson's impromptu trip achieved its immediate political purpose of delaying a confrontation with domestic critics of his support of US policy in Vietnam. The trip should satisfy some doubters that Wilson is doing all he can in the cause of peace and that Communist intransigence is responsible for the Vietnamese deadlock. The trip is unlikely, however, to soothe for long the growing number of opponents of Wilson's Vietnamese policy, and his reception by the Russians--perfunctory bordering on rude--did not help his efforts to develop a "peacemaker" image.

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Far East

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Allied and Vietnamese Army (ARVN) forces have stepped up the scale and intensity of battalion-sized or larger spoiling operations against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) units in South Vietnam, with encouraging results. Last week the number of Communist troops killed and captured exceeded 1,000 for the tenth consecutive week.

The heaviest fighting occurred in northernmost Quang Tri Province. Six US Marine and five ARVN battalions participating in search-and-destroy Operation HASTINGS/LAM SON 289 engaged in almost continuous large-scale combat with major elements of at least one and possibly all three regiments of the 324th PAVN Infantry Division. By Wednesday the US and ARVN forces, supported by heavy B-52 Stratofortress bombing strikes, had at least temporarily delayed or disrupted a major Communist drive and had killed more than 425 North Vietnamese regulars.

Operation MACON, a clearing/security/pacification mission by three US Marine battalions southwest of Da Nang, and Operation MOKULEIA, conducted by three battalions of the US 25th Infantry Division in the Hau Nghia - Tay Ninh - Binh Duong triborder area northwest of Saigon, also achieved favorable results. More than 240 Viet Cong were reported killed. US losses were moderate.

Communist-initiated military activity during the past week was highlighted by battalion-sized attacks against South Vietnamese Regional Force positions in Binh Thuan and Binh Duong provinces on 15 and 18 July, respectively. In addition, an enemy unit of undetermined strength conducted a damaging ambush against an ARVN road-clearing operation in Binh Duong Province on 15 July.


Political Developments in Saigon

The 12th anniversary of the 1954 Geneva Accords on 20 July afforded the South Vietnamese Government an opportunity to publicize once more its uncompromising views on ending the war. A government proclamation stated that abandonment of the war effort by Hanoi, including withdrawal of PAVN troops from South Vietnam and dissolution of the National Liberation Front, was necessary before bombings of the North could be stopped and allied troops withdrawn from the South.

This position is essentially no departure from previous government statements. Foreign Ministry officials reportedly were privately pleased by Ho Chi Minh's recent public reaffirmation of the DRV "hard line," feeling that this should dispel any "wishful thinking" in the South about peace negotiations.

There has been no major political activity reported since

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the announcement of Premier Ky's revised cabinet and the initial filing last week of candidates for the September constitutional assembly election. Unresolved leadership and policy problems within the Buddhist Institute continued to prevent any settlement between it and the government. On his own, the institute's moderate chairman, Tam Chau, sought the release of Buddhist monks under government detention and avoided attending meetings of the institute council.

South's Economic Situation

The rate of price increases in South Vietnam has slowed somewhat since the period last month immediately following the government's announcement of devaluation and other economic reforms. However, high prices reportedly remain the major topic of conversation among Vietnamese, outranking the forthcoming elections and even the war itself.

Workers in the Saigon area employed by RMK, the major US construction combine in South Vietnam, may strike again next week for higher pay, despite the 15-percent raise recently given all RMK employees.

"Mobilization" in North Vietnam

Hanoi attempted this week to dramatize its determination to continue the war with tough public pronouncements highlighted by a special Ho Chi Minh announcement on 17 July that the country's reserves would be "partially mobilized." These statements

all emphasized an intent to stay in the fight whatever the cost.

Ho's 17 July announcement, well advertised in advance, turned out to be somewhat anticlimactic. Since April 1965 the DRV has added some 100,000 men to its regular army, a million to its militia forces, and 300,000 to the paramilitary crews building and repairing roads. In view of this already high degree of mobilization, the new "partial" mobilization order is believed to represent more of a propaganda response to the POL strikes than any change in Hanoi's call-up program.

The North Vietnamese manpower pool is believed capable of expanding all categories of manpower related to the war effort even further. Ho's pronouncement may have been aimed in part at preparing the populace for a further call-up of reservists and younger men, at least some of whom will probably end up in South Vietnam. In the first half of 1966 some 30,000 North Vietnamese military personnel were sent into South Vietnam, and Hanoi appears still to be maintaining this high rate of infiltration.

The most significant infiltration this year involves elements of the 324th North Vietnamese Infantry Division. The presence of one regiment of this division --the 812th--has been confirmed in Quang Tri Province. Two other regiments

may also be in the province.

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These units reportedly came directly across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the first regular North Vietnamese units reported to have utilized this route. The others have moved around the DMZ through Laos. The unit reportedly covered the new route in only 12 days, whereas the trek down the Laos infiltration corridor normally takes four to six weeks. Groups subjected to the long march through Laos, moreover, reportedly suffer a high rate of disease,

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The infiltration of part or all of the 324th Division at this time may reflect Hanoi's concern with the deteriorating Viet Cong military position in the central highlands. A large Communist force very near the North Vietnamese border could allow the Communists to mount a number of large-scale attacks in Quang Tri. They might hope such actions would draw off US forces from the highlands, giving the hard-pressed Communist troops there a respite and an opportunity to launch some of their long-planned operations.

Chinese Propaganda Support

Chinese propaganda continues to play up Peking's steadfastness in assisting the Vietnamese Communists, but the emphasis remains on Hanoi's own persistence.

The People's Daily editorial comment on Ho's 17 July "mobilization" announcement, broadcast by Peking on 18 July, had a similar thrust. While promising "resolute support," with the usual caveats, it did not have the ring of enthusiasm that marked Chinese statements on this subject a year ago. A reference to the possibility that all of Vietnam will be turned into a US colony did not specify what China would do in that event. In formulating their own position with regard to the Vietnamese, the Chinese have begun to use the formulation "great rear area"--which suggests that Peking is more reluctant than ever to become directly involved.

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NORTH KOREA ENCOUNTERING SNAGS ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT

Pyongyang's diplomatic offensive in its competition with Seoul has, in the past few months, met with setbacks in Ghana, Indonesia, and Tanzania. Syria this week announced a decision to establish relations with North

Korea, but this gain will only partially offset Pyongyang's losses.

South Korea still holds a nearly three-to-one advantage over North Korea in terms of international recognition. Pyongyang

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made substantial gains from 1963 to 1965 when ten states of Asia and Africa extended recognition. Previously only two non-Communist states--Guinea and Mali--had done so.

The first reversal of the trend in Pyongyang's favor came in Indonesia. Pyongyang's important diplomatic success in gaining recognition by Djakarta in April 1964 was undercut by the September 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia, and North Korean criticism of Peking's involvement reflected Pyongyang's concern for its own position in Indonesia. For the past few months Pyongyang's emissaries in Djakarta have been on the defensive, and in May the North Korean ambassador attempted to discourage the Indonesians from recognizing South Korea. However, the Indonesian Government has already agreed in principle to the opening of a South Korean consulate general in Djakarta, and Seoul reportedly hopes to send a mission in August.

In Ghana, events since the military take-over have brought relations close to the breaking point. Pyongyang did not approve of the new regime and withheld its recognition. The new Ghanaian leadership, in turn, looked with disfavor on the North Korean mission's close and obvious dependence on the Chinese Commu-

nist Embassy. Last month Pyongyang, following the example of Hanoi, closed its embassy in Accra. Ghana is now receptive to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul which sent an emissary last week to begin negotiations.

In Tanzania, the reception of a North Korean good-will mission earlier this month was at best cool. The visit was not followed by the usual joint communiqué, reportedly because of Tanzanian refusal to endorse a diatribe against the United States. The mission's heavy-handed propaganda pressure appears to have dispelled some illusions in Dar es Salaam about the North Korean regime.

Visits by this same mission to the UAR immediately before and after the Tanzanian stop resulted in little more than pro forma expressions of friendship and solidarity. It arrived in Iraq on 17 July and may yet visit other countries on its present tour.

The non-Communist states which currently recognize Pyongyang, in addition to Indonesia, the UAR, Tanzania, Ghana, and Syria, are Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Uganda, Yemen, Mauritania, Cambodia, and Congo (Brazzaville).

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Europe

SOVIET SALES OF COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT

The USSR still is far from being a serious competitor of Western manufacturers of commercial aircraft, but its discount prices and long-term credit offers attract purchasers in Communist as well as less developed countries. One of its more popular exports is the twin turbo-prop short-range AN-24 Coke transport. The modified AN-2 Colt biplane, widely used for crop dusting, also has drawn a number of customers.

Recent Czech negotiations for Western long-range jet aircraft still may founder over arrangements for financing, servicing, and spare parts, and Prague may reconsider purchasing the Soviet IL-62 Classic, comparable to the British VC-10. Poland, faced with difficulties in obtaining spare parts for its Conquairs and DC-3s and short of hard currency, has ordered 3 AN-24s and an unspecified number of TU-134 Crusty medium-range jets from Moscow for delivery this year. Cuba has received 8 AN-24s this year to replace the obsolete IL-14 Crates in use on its internal routes. China also received two AN-24s as well as two TU-124 Cookpot short-to-medium-range jet airliners--the first all-jet transport aircraft in Peking's civil air fleet. Recent Soviet aircraft deliveries to North Vietnam include 2 AN-24s,

an IL-18 Coot, and six MI-6 Hook helicopters.

Moscow, apparently hoping to re-establish the dominant position in Guinea's civil air operations lost to Pan American last year, provided two AN-24s in March on a loan basis to meet urgent Air Guinea service requirements. If Guinea's current negotiations to purchase US transports from Fairchild fall through, it will have little alternative but to turn back to Moscow for assistance. Congo (Brazzaville) has acquired at least one AN-24 with possibly one more on order, and the Somali Republic is awaiting delivery of an unspecified number of the same aircraft.

Despite an active sales promotion campaign in the industrial West--highlighted by the major Soviet display at the Paris air show last year--Moscow has made no headway there. Some sales of Soviet helicopters may develop. Earlier this year Moscow took the MI-6 on a demonstration and publicity campaign through a number of European countries.

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FURTHER INTERNAL SHAKEUP INDICATED IN ALBANIA

Albania's top leaders appear to be setting the stage to deal with serious party factionalism that became evident last spring. Although they have not identified those in disfavor, both party boss Hoxha and Premier Shehu in recent speeches have referred to "hostile elements" within Albania and have hinted that some are guilty of "revisionism."

Factionalism in Albania first came to light earlier this year when the regime took measures to deal with "bureaucratic excesses." As many as 8,000 government personnel reportedly have since been assigned to work in agriculture and industry brigades. Last March, Shehu announced that the number of personnel in the central state administration had been reduced by 50 percent. These changes seem designed to tighten party control in the central and local governments.

Then, in a speech on 4 July, Shehu again warned that remnants of the overthrown "exploiting" classes and "hostile enemies born from our own ranks," were acting to re-establish a capitalist regime. He said that the measures taken so far were only the beginning of a general program to revolutionize life in Albania.

These remarks suggest that additional personnel changes will be forthcoming, but the regime apparently is not yet ready to

move. The national elections of 10 July returned every high-ranking official of the party and government to the National Assembly.

At a party central committee plenum held on 12 and 13 July it was announced that the Fifth Party Congress would be held in November. The congress had been planned for sometime in the first half of 1966, which, in view of the party statutes, would already have it a year late. These delays are themselves indicative of internal party problems. Resolution of these problems may now come in November. The draft directives for the congress, published last week, call for a "merciless pursuit" and determined struggle against "internal enemies."

The Albanian military hierarchy may be at the center of the factionalism because of its opposition to the revolutionary, Chinese-style approach to Communism. Predictably, Albanian soldiers are not happy with a recent decree that abolishes rank and insignia and [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Albanian officers appear uniformly sullen about the re-introduction of political commissars in all military units. The regime's deep concern with the military's discontent is probably reflected in the replacement of the chief and deputy chief of the army's political directorate. [REDACTED]

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FRENCH TAKING HARDER LINE IN NATO NEGOTIATIONS

Since President de Gaulle's return from the USSR the French have taken a harder line in negotiations with their NATO partners over the mission of their military forces.

At the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting on 19 July the French representative told the other fourteen that France does not accept their statement of "assumptions" regarding French intentions toward military cooperation with NATO. This statement had been presented to the French at a NAC meeting last week as a means of meeting the requirement laid down in the communiqué of the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels that agreement on political matters must be reached in NAC before there are discussions on a military level of the future mission of the French forces.

The French representative maintained that the Fourteen's "assumptions" were a distortion of the French position and that the Brussels requirement for an "exchange of views" in NAC had been satisfied by the French statement at a meeting of NAC on 21 June. Thus, he claimed, it was now appropriate for the French chief of staff and SACEUR to begin detailed negotiations.

The consensus of the NAC representatives of the Fourteen Allies is that the Brussels requirement was not met by the

French statement of 21 June. The French agreed to a request by the NATO secretary general to check back with their government to determine whether the statement of "assumptions" could not at least serve as the basis for further discussions in NAC. Failure to do this, the secretary general indicated, would lead to an impasse and require referral back to the NATO foreign ministers.

It remains doubtful that De Gaulle will agree to any written statement--such as now contained in the "assumptions"--which would lead to automatic involvement of French forces in case of hostilities. The harder French line may also be due to an awareness that internal pressures on the West German Government might lead to an agreement allowing French troops to remain in Germany in a status more favorable to the French than Bonn is at present willing to accept. If such a bargain can be struck with the Germans, Paris may feel its position in the negotiations with the Fourteen would be strengthened.

Meanwhile, Belgium has objected to the proposed relocation in West Germany of the Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT). The Belgians were upset when the Germans made a firm offer to put up AFCENT in Aachen, and the Dutch subsequently withdrew their offer to

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locate it in the Netherlands. The Belgians felt the Dutch were taking on their fair share of NATO installations after the Belgians quickly approved relocation of the Supreme Headquar-

ters Allied Command Europe in their country. However, following Belgian-Dutch talks on the matter, the Netherlands has again offered to accept either AFCENT or the US European Command (EUCOM).

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Middle East - Africa

YEMENI REPUBLICANS CONSIDERING INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT

Leading Yemeni Republicans, apparently fed up with the Egyptian presence in Yemen, are currently exploring the possibility of forming an independent republican government against Egyptian wishes.

Yemeni Prime Minister Amri, presently in Cairo, submitted his resignation on 14 July in protest over Egypt's interference in Yemen's internal affairs, including flooding the country with worthless paper currency. Amri's resignation, in turn, has reportedly moved every member of Yemen's Republican Council to follow suit. Important military leaders, including the chief of staff, apparently support the protest also. Even more significant is the reported backing of leading tribal sheiks.

The Egyptians have so far suppressed any official announcement of the resignations, even though these have reportedly been accepted by the acting Presi-

dent, who is also a member of the dissident group.

On 17 July a representative of the group approached a US official in Yemen and requested financial assistance to pay off the republican army.

Discontent in Yemen has been exacerbated by drought and inflation. Religious friction and southern resentment of domination by the predominantly northern republican government recently flared in a rebellion in the Bayda area of southern Yemen. The arrival of republican army elements and tribal levies forced a truce, but there have been signs of tribal restlessness in other areas.

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SUDAN GOVERNMENT STILL TROUBLED BY FACTIONALISM

The coalition government in the Sudan is still disrupted by factionalism within the Umma Party, and efforts to solve the country's major problems remain at a standstill.

As the political arm of the conservative Islamic Ansar Brotherhood, the Umma is the Sudan's dominant political force. The Ansar are the descendants or followers of the Mahdi Mohammad Ahmad, who besieged Egyptian-held Khartoum in 1885, killed General Charles Gordon, and ruled the Sudan until defeated by British-led forces in 1898. The brotherhood today includes approximately four million Sudanese, roughly one third of the country's total population.

The Umma's current turmoil has been developing for months. Essentially, it results from the attempts of Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Mahdi's 30-year-old great-grandson and president of the Umma, to broaden the party's base by including elements outside the Ansar brotherhood, particularly more politically sophisticated townsmen. Sadiq has obtained the support of a number of influential parliamentarians in this effort, but has been opposed by his uncle, the traditional leader of the Ansar, Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi.

Sadiq also wants to replace the ineffectual Mohammed Mahjoub as prime minister, and it is on this immediate issue that Sadiq and his uncle have locked horns, since the Imam has generally supported Mahjoub. Sadiq's backers are now attempting to force a showdown and install Sadiq himself as premier. Sadiq has been reluctant to provoke an open conflict with the Imam or risk a split within the party. Should the issue come to a vote in the Sudanese parliament, however, Sadiq could almost certainly control a majority vote despite the Imam's opposition.

The intraparty conflict has so preoccupied the politicians in Khartoum that they have taken no new steps toward a settlement of the continuing Negroid separatist rebellion in the country's three southern provinces. The government's military campaign against the dissidents also is stalemated.

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INTERNATIONAL COURT THROWS OUT SOUTH-WEST AFRICA CASE

South African whites are jubilant over the decision this week of the UN's International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning South-West Africa. The ICJ refused on procedural grounds to pass judgment on whether South Africa had violated its international responsibilities in its administration of South-West Africa, a League of Nations mandate. The court decided that the plaintiffs, Liberia and Ethiopia, had no legal right to require South Africa to meet its mandate obligations. According to the court, only the defunct League of Nations had that right.

South African Government spokesmen have no illusions, however, that the ICJ decision will prevent further action by African governments and others against Pretoria's racial policy in South-West Africa and, ultimately, within South Africa itself.

At the same time, these spokesmen note that the ICJ decision relieves Western powers of the legal responsibility to support enforcement measures, such as sanctions against South Africa, which a different ICJ decision might have brought. They say that any new responsibilities which the West may assume will be taken for political reasons and in response to new initiatives against South Africa by the black African states.

The African governments have apparently reached no decision on their next step. Like almost everyone else, they seem

not to have anticipated the ICJ's decision and have no contingency plans. Indeed, it is questionable that the Africans had an agreed plan of action in case the court's decision had gone against South Africa. The Africa Group at the UN has set up an eight-member steering committee to consider future action.

There is a possibility that the Africans may call for a special session of the General Assembly--an idea which the USSR is reported to support. Another possibility is a Security Council meeting to constitute a special committee on South-West Africa to act as the interested party and take the case back to the ICJ on behalf of the UN. However, this raises the question of whether such a committee can legally do this and might require a preliminary ICJ advisory opinion. There has also been at least one African suggestion for a ministers' meeting of the Organization of African Unity.

Available comments about the ICJ decision from other parts of the world vary from critical disappointment in the Netherlands to a sigh of relief in the British Foreign Office.

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BELGIAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS UNDER HEAVY STRAIN

The Congo's President Mobutu has continued to harass the Belgian Government and Belgian enterprises in his country. Brussels has now indicated it may end its technical assistance rather than accept further provocations.

Mobutu is trying to bolster his regime's prestige at home and throughout Africa by demanding "economic independence" through the "Congolization" of Belgian-controlled enterprises. One target has been Belgium's government-controlled Sabena airline, which owns 30 percent of the Congo's domestic airline. Sabena has refused to knuckle under to Mobutu's pressures to give up this interest, and has threatened to withdraw vital technical assistance after 31 July unless certain blocked funds are released. Mobutu is now threatening to deny the airline landing and overflight rights and, to fill

the gap, is looking to other carriers, including the Soviets.

The Belgians are chagrined by Mobutu's unilateral moves to settle such outstanding issues as concession and mining rights. His government has recently taken over rights of two mining companies granted by the former Belgian colonial government. This move, however, was very limited since both companies were practically defunct and one was almost totally owned by the Congolese Government.

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STEP-UP IN SOVIET MILITARY AID DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA

A recent surge of military aid deliveries to Algeria again indicates Moscow's willingness to supply such assistance to Algiers despite the change of regimes last year. Since Ahmed Ben Bella's overthrow, Moscow has maintained

a restrained but proper relationship with the Boumediene regime, and has continued its arms shipments. Algeria is the second largest recipient of Soviet military aid in Africa.

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In the past two months at least six Soviet freighters carrying military cargo have arrived in Algiers. Deliveries this year have included 20 MIG-21 Fishbed jet fighters with a limited all-weather capability--the first Algeria has received--as well as additional MI-4 Hound helicopters, surface-to-air missile equipment, artillery, armored personnel carriers, ammunition, and spare parts.

Algeria continues to be used for transshipment of Soviet military aid deliveries to other African countries. Recently, five Soviet AN-12 Cub transports--the first Soviet transports used to deliver MIG aircraft--stopped at Algiers en route to Mali.

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ECUADOREAN PRESIDENT YIELDS TO STRIKERS

25X1 Ecuador's interim President Yerovi yielded last week to demands of provincial interests striking against a revenue measure. [REDACTED]

25X1 This is the first time Yerovi has submitted to special interests resisting his financial measures. He conceded in order to end a five-day general strike in Cotopaxi Province protesting a decree depriving the provincial government of a share of banana export tax revenues which they have received heretofore. Yerovi's capitulation will damage his prestige and authority and encourage other groups to strike for concessions.

25X1 Velasco and his followers were not able to exploit the Cotopaxi strike [REDACTED]

They remain eager to capitalize on Yerovi's difficulties, however [REDACTED]

25X1 Peruvian plans to commemorate the 25th anniversary of

the 1941 border war with Ecuador have provoked press and street reaction in Ecuador which will probably worsen before the celebration ends on 31 July. The boundary is a hypersensitive issue in Ecuador, and a frontier shooting incident is a possibility. Velasco, during his third and fourth presidencies (1952-56, 1960-61), was the leading advocate of revising the border in Ecuador's favor, and he might play on public emotions in an attempt to oust Yerovi.

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GUATEMALA'S REACTIONS TO RECENT GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS

As expected, the new Guatemalan Government is under pressure from both right and left. Conservative circles are privately expressing fears that the majority of President Mendez' second-echelon appointments are going to "known leftists." The Communist guerrillas have rejected his "peace" overtures and pledged instead to give a new push to their revolutionary struggle.

Mendez and Foreign Minister Arenales appear to have had a confrontation over appointment of Miguel Angel Asturias as ambassador to France. A long-time resident of Paris, Asturias is a poet and writer with a long history of Communist activities. During his residence in France he has been involved in activities connected

with Guatemalan and international Communism and has traveled widely in the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. Last May, he was announced as a winner of the 1966 Lenin Peace Prize.

According to the US Embassy, Arenales was opposed to the appointment. A Foreign Ministry official said that it was "rammed down his throat."

In the widespread confusion surrounding the new government appointments one fact is clear--some extremists are getting government posts, possibly because of Mendez' inexperience or poor advice.

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Approved For Release 2009/03/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300120005-8

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